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Abstract The research reported here investigated the everyday and scientific repertoires of
children involved in semi-structured, Piagetian interviews carried out to check their under-
standing of dynamic astronomical concepts like daytime and night-time. It focused on the
switching taking place between embedded and disembedded thinking; on the imagery which
subjects referred to in their verbal dialogue and their descriptions of drawings and play-dough
models of the Earth, Sun and Moon; and it examined the prevalence and character of animism
and figurative speech in children’s thinking. Five hundred and thirty-nine children (aged 3–18)
from Wairarapa in New Zealand (171 boys and 185 girls) and Changchun in China (99 boys
and 84 girls) took part in the study. Modified ordinal scales for the relevant concept categories
were used to classify children’s responses and data from each age group (with numbers
balanced as closely as practicable by culture and gender) analysed with Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample tests (at an alpha level of 0.05). Although, in general, there was
consistency of dynamic concepts within and across media and their associated modalities in
keeping with the theory of conceptual coherence (see Blown and Bryce 2010; Bryce and
Blown 2016), there were several cases of inter-modal and intra-modal switching in both
cultures. Qualitative data from the interview protocols revealed how children switch between
everyday and scientific language (in both directions) and use imagery in response to
questioning. The research indicates that children’s grasp of scientific ideas in this field may
ordinarily be under-estimated if one only goes by formal scientific expression and vocabulary.
Keywords Everydayandscientific language .Embeddedanddisembedded thinking .Switching
. Animism and figurative speech . Astronomy. Daytime and night-time
Much of the published research into the acquisition of scientific ideas by young people has
concentrated upon their growing accumulation of correct or appropriately expressed terms for
important concepts. This paper explores the boundaries between such language and the
communications which precede and pre-determine its character. The empirical research which
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we describe examines the language used by children to convey their understanding of basic
ideas in earth science and astronomy. It focuses on both their everyday and their scientific
speech repertoires and how they switch between them and use imagery in response to
questioning. First, we look at the key literature concerning the difficulties which children
encounter in learning the language of science.
The Complex Language of Science
In their stimulating book on teaching, Postman and Weingartner (1971) stated that a subject or
discipline, such as science, Bis a way of knowing, and whatever is known is inseparable from
the symbols (mostly words) in which the knowing is codified^ (p. 103). They argued
powerfully that every teacher is a teacher of language, a view that was thereafter espoused
by many concerned with the educational process, whether as practitioners determined to
improve students’ learning or as researchers keen to unravel the complexities of how young
people develop cognitively. Wellington and Osborne (2001) noted that learning science is, in
many respects, like learning a new language, with considerable complications, not least
because Bmany of the hard conceptual words…have a precise meaning in science and
sometimes an exact definition, but a very different meaning in everyday life^ (p. 5). Some
of our familiar everyday words are taken over by science. Words which we have long used to
mean something rather general can have a particular meaning for scientists (e.g. children may
use ‘insect’ for every creepy-crawly, but the biologist keeps it for a particular group of
invertebrates). Some scientific terms are metaphors and therefore make for added difficulties
when a child is listening to the words of a speaker using scientific language (e.g. a ‘force field’
bears little resemblance to a ‘field’ as far as young learners are concerned). The notion of
action at a distance is a very demanding abstract idea. Bar et al. (1997) found that pupils (even
up to 18 years of age in their study), while regarding gravity as a force that holds people on the
Earth and causes things to fall downwards, did not relate it to the Newtonian idea of a force
between two masses in space. As Wellington and Osborne (2001) observed, teaching science
also involves Bintroducing new words in familiar contexts…but at other times in unfamiliar
contexts^ (p. 5).
Recognising these points, teachers and researchers need to proceed cautiously when young
people use scientific words; uttering the words does not necessarily mean the terms are
understood. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 233) stated, Bunderstanding is only possible
through the negotiation of meaning^ (emphasis added). Reiterating this, Niebert et al. (2012)
showed that in helping students to come to terms with how the scientific community uses
terminology, helpful metaphors and analogies must be unpacked carefully in terms of students’
own everyday lives and direct experiences. Unfortunately, in general, Bteachers are not
sophisticated in the way they teach good scientific language^ (see Brown and Ryoo 2008).
And if school science fails to get students talking and thinking like scientists, then BRather than
becoming scientifically literate, they become scientifically indifferent^ (Aikenhead 2011, p.
10).
In the case of earth science and astronomy, a number of the object words are clear (the Sun,
the Moon…) but, to the uninitiated, many others are confusing. For example, many young
children take the word ‘earth’ to mean ‘dirt’ or ‘soil’ rather than ‘planet Earth’ which calls for
caution when asking simple questions such as BTell me about the Earth?^ At a higher level, the
distinctive meanings of the words star and planet are difficult to grasp and certainly it is not
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easy for the inexperienced eye to tell them apart, going simply by observations of the sky at
night. Other ideas are even more difficult, for example: where the Earth’s atmosphere ‘stops’ is
conceptually challenging for secondary pupils; the teacher’s explanation for the Milky Way—
that cloudy band across the night sky—being Bthe view of our disc-shaped galaxy from the
inside^ takes more than a stretch of the imagination; and a ‘light year’must seem simply weird
to pupils—an expression surely intended to be confusing. Findings by Bailey et al. (2012)
indicate that students commonly misidentify the light year as a measurement of time. Perhaps
most difficult are the ideas which involve dynamic concepts, ones where the movements of
celestial objects have to be envisioned together in order to grasp what comes about and why.
The distinctions between rotation and revolution, for example, concerning the motion of the
Earth on its axis in a day and around the Sun in a year; of the Moon and why we see only one
face of it; the relative motions of the Earth, the Sun and the Moon which bring about eclipses;
and so forth, certainly make big demands of primary school age and many older pupils. Later
in this article, we focus upon dynamic concepts in order to illustrate how young children
respond when questioned about their thoughts and ‘active’ images.
The Developmental Perspective: Language Switching
Children acquire vocabulary gradually, refining their familiar word usage by adopting more
formal, scientific terminology through encouragement and pressure from their teachers and
practising new expressions where they see fit. Researchers have argued for some time that the
everyday knowledge that children have acquired, preschool and extra-school, sometimes
referred to as their ‘socialised knowledge’, is highly robust and never fully replaced by formal
scientific understanding. Children have to learn to move between the embedded modes of
thinking determined by how they have managed the everyday world and the disembedded
modes of thinking dictated by the abstract, symbolic world of the scientist (see Donaldson
1978). Perceptively, Solomon (1983a) concluded:
The deepest levels of understanding are achieved neither in the abstract heights of ‘pure’
physics, nor by a struggle to eliminate the inexact structures of social communication,
but by the fluency and discrimination with which we learn to move between these two
contrasting domains of knowledge.
Crossing back and forwards between everyday and scientific language (a ‘switching’ of
different repertoires) is not symmetrical. Teachers, for example, may well challenge pupils
orally using ordinary language or set out science questions in familiar contexts, thereby
encouraging pupils to resort to their familiar ways of thinking. Crossing back to the symbolic
world can be very challenging, as observant teachers know. Nevertheless, with greater
confidence, learners can consolidate their use of scientific expressions and endeavour to use
them in increasingly less familiar contexts. van Oers (1998) has argued that we do not simply
learn to ‘dis-embed’ ideas, we actually learn to recontextualize our past notions and this is a
progressive, iterative process. Whether so or not, it is important to acknowledge that a young
person may use both forms of expression for an idea, at different times and in different
contexts; the meaning the individual is actually working with might be the same.
The researcher needs to (i) assess how young people handle, in the vernacular, ideas which
they will later describe scientifically and (ii) explore the transitions which are made as children
become more linguistically discriminating in their vocabulary. Since the drive to achieve
control of situations arises very early in life (Donaldson 1978), the transition from embedded
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to disembedded thinking must similarly have origins in the early years of childhood. In more
recent times, we have certainly seen researchers focusing upon the preschool years to explore
the transitions of concern. For example, Fleer’s (2009) study looked into the 4–5-year-old
children’s concept formation in two early childhood settings (one rural and the other urban), in
particular at the reciprocity between everyday and scientific thinking. Her findings indicated
that the playful contexts did indeed help children to bring together their everyday ideas with
scientific concepts.
A related matter is the use of animism and teleological explanations in humans, the latter
where an ultimate purpose is used as a means of explaining a phenomenon rather than any
postulated cause, e.g. ‘The Moon plays at night and sleeps in the daytime’; ‘the Moon glows at
night so that we can see’; ‘trees produce oxygen so that animals and humans can breathe’; etc.
While we will say more about animism a little later, it is notable that, while contemporary
science dismisses teleological argument, young children display notable preferences for it.
Among school-aged children, Kelemen and Rosset (2009) observed that Bteleological intui-
tions explicitly link to beliefs about intentional causality in nature…with children’s ideas not
straightforwardly explained by parental explanations…or ambient cultural religiosity^ (p.
138). And Kelemen et al. (2012) further argued that the propensity for teleological explanation
does not simply disappear with maturity and development. Some adult populations display
broad teleological intuitions, at least some of the time or in some circumstances. Surprisingly,
even professional physical scientists can display remnants of it in their thinking, particularly
when they are forced to reason at speed, according to Kelemen et al. (2012) who state: BA
religion-consistent default cognitive bias toward teleological explanation tenaciously persists
and may have subtle but profound consequences for scientific progress^ (p. 1). Also, through
comparisons between Alzheimer’s patients and healthy controls, teleological intuitions seem to
reassert themselves when the coherence of knowledge is eroded by disease. These researchers
therefore argue that, while extended education in science reduces tendencies to reason in
inaccurate teleological ways, such propensities are masked rather than completely replaced.
Hence, particularly with respect to young people, reasoning may display both scientific and
everyday intuitive ideas.
Scaffolding
Several writers have focused upon how young people may be assisted to change from
everyday to scientific language. Bruner (1966, 1986), Lemke (1990), Taber (2000), Driver
et al. (2000), Newton (2002), Mercer et al. (2004) and, more recently, Brown and his co-
authors (Brown and Ryoo 2008; Brown et al. 2010; Brown and Spang 2008), for example,
concentrate on how thinking may be scaffolded (to use Bruner’s term for the sociocultural
learning process exemplified by Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development (ZPD); see Foley
1994; Mooney 2000). From an ethnographic perspective, Brown and colleagues’ work has
emphasised the linguistic dimensions of scaffolding. Their premise is that Bscience instruction
that does not seek to actively deconstruct science teaching into conceptual and language
components runs the risk of negatively affecting students’ conceptual understanding and
Discursive Identity development^ (Brown and Ryoo 2008, p. 532). As argued earlier by
Lemke (1990) who, like Wellington and Osborne (2001), wrote about science as a foreign
language, Brown and Ryoo advocated that science should be taught using a hybrid of
language, by firstly introducing ideas in the vernacular using everyday vocabulary and
secondly then requiring students to use scientific discourse. From a study of the sociolinguistic
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discourse of a science teacher, Brown and his co-researchers concluded that, Bby including
vernacular alternatives to science terms, students were given a vision of science that was
connected to their collective experience^ (Brown and Spang 2008, p. 731). They believe that
Bthe acquisition of the academic language of science remains one of the most difficult aspects
of students’ science learning^ (Brown et al. 2010, p. 1490). Lemke’s (1990) firm recommen-
dation was that
Teachers should express all semantic relations among terms, and all conceptual rela-
tionships for each topic, in ordinary colloquial language as well as in scientific language,
insofar as possible, and clearly signal when they are using each.
And, according to Hsu and Roth’s recent microanalysis of classroom interactions and
dialogue, the discourse of science classrooms continues to be ‘a heterogeneous mix of
scientific and non-scientific language’. For them, Blearning science is a process of appropri-
ating authoritative discourse into internally persuasive discourse^ (Hsu and Roth 2014, p.
729). Renshaw and Brown (2007) identify four formats of teacher classroom talk for integrat-
ing everyday and scientific discourse, referring to them as replacement, interweaving, contex-
tual privileging and pastiche. They suggest that
Within one classroom episode, a teacher might deploy paraphrasing strategies to extend
students’ vocabulary (replacement); might invite students to converse about their expe-
riences at home or with friends that connect with a curriculum topic (interweaving);
might challenge students to consider the kinds of arguments and evidence that hold sway
in this discussion (contextual privileging); and might bring together for consideration a
number of plausible representations of a concept and reflect on how the array of
representations assists a deeper understanding of the topic (pastiche) (Renshaw and
Brown 2007, p. 544).
Picking up on the second point (interweaving), it is worth noting the impact which relatives
have on the scientific sense-making of young people through the naturally occurring interac-
tions and dialogue of family life. Ash (2004), for example, studying the reflective family
conversations encountered during aquarium visits, argued that Bfamily collaborative dialogues
in nonschool settings can be the foundations for scientific ways of thinking^ (p. 857).
Tenenbaum and Callanan (2008) looked at parent-child conversations apparent both at home
and while families attended a children’s museum, detecting variations in the explanatory
speech provided by parents depending on the amount of their own schooling. In a small study
of parent and child interviews (conducted separately and specifically about the Moon),
Venville et al. (2012) noted that children’s idiosyncratic ideas were influenced not only by
observation of physical factors in their environment but also through social interaction and
cultural activities. The investigations by Jane and Robbins (2007) showed how grandparents
often assisted children’s acquisitions of science and technology ideas through the everyday
interactions they have during childminding activities involving home computers, games,
garden play, outdoor excursions and so forth.
Theorising the Links Between Everyday and Scientific Language
The promotion of scaffolding essentially reinstates everyday intuitive ideas as the foundation
of later scientific learning. It replaces two earlier theories in one. Firstly, it annuls Piaget’s stage
theory by applying the Ausubelian principle that anything can be meaningfully taught to any
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child at any age provided care is taken to ascertain where the child is at and building on that.
Secondly, it supersedes a conceptual change theory insofar as it not only accepts the reality of
coexisting modes of thought and language but also utilises them to build new knowledge.
Scaffolding is well exemplified by Socratic dialogue where the teacher (or interviewer) takes
the child gradually to a higher level of thought by sensitive probing of what the child already
knows in embryonic form. Piaget’s collaborator, Claparède, categorised children’s thought as
‘syncretic’ and adult thought as ‘logical’. Syncretism represented the tendency Bto merge
diverse elements into one unarticulated image on the strength of some chance impression^
(Vygotsky 2012, p. 118). Vygotsky himself described them as ‘unorganized heaps’ and viewed
schooling, with its emphasis upon using language to talk about language, as the important
factor in helping children to acquire scientific concepts. Logical thought develops in stages
(very differently theorized by these psychologists), with Vygotsky stressing the role of social
interaction between child and adults such as parents and teachers. While both he and Piaget
acknowledged that the two types of language and thought—egocentric, everyday cognitions
and scientific thinking—continue to coexist in the mind of any individual person, Vygotsky
(2012) considered this to happen to a greater degree. In Thought and Language, he reasoned
that everyday, spontaneous concepts and scientific concepts were in continual interaction. His
zone of proximal development was the meeting place of everyday and scientific concepts.
Using an example pertinent to the present study, Kozulin states in the foreword to the recent
edition of Thought and Language that
[Vygotsky] indicated that there is a significant difference, even a conflict, between
spontaneous concepts that we acquire in our everyday experience and that might be
adequate for daily life (e.g. BThe sun rises in the morning^) and the corresponding
academic concepts essential for scientific and technological reasoning (BWhat appears as
a sunrise is the result of the rotation of the Earth around its axis^) (Kozulin 2012, p.
xviii).
See also John-Steiner et al. (1998) who Bconceptualize everyday and scientific concepts as
an interconnected dynamic system rather than as separate processes implied by dichotomous
relationships^ (p. 127). Interestingly, recent thinking concerning the nature of concepts draws a
distinction between formal and functional concepts with Greeno (2012) seeing it as nearly
parallel to Vygotsky’s distinction between scientific concepts and everyday concepts. By
including activities, particularly instructional activities, in a functional approach, the concepts
of a discipline like science can be related to the information and activities that are in students’
prior knowledge and understanding.
Animism and Anthropomorphism in Young Children’s Explanations
Studies of children’s explanations, not least those concerned with questions about the Earth
and space, show that young children frequently invoke animism (where life or consciousness
is attributed to inanimate objects) and also anthropomorphism (where human characteristics
are ascribed in some of the detail). Examples of the former would include BThe Sun is hiding
behind the mountains^ or, more metaphorically, BPlants love the Sun because he wants them to
grow .^ Examples of the latter would include BThe Man in the Moon eats it to make the sky
dark^ or BThe Sun scares away the stars^. The children’s use of language with elements of
animism, anthropomorphism, personification, analogy, simile and metaphor has been studied
extensively worldwide (see Table 1 and notes).
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The researchers who have probed the children’s use of figurative speech forms, such as
BThe Moon goes to bed to sleep during the daytime. The Sun goes to bed to sleep at night-
time^, usually reveal that the child does not really believe that the Sun and Moon sleep as we
sleep, or have beds as we have beds, but rather that they are not visibly active and, by analogy,
are resting in some way, somewhere. A number of these researchers have concluded that when
children resort to animistic expressions, they are essentially misapplying aspects of their
acquired knowledge, including details gained through social traditions and storytelling. For
example, Vosniadou (1989) concluded that children’s notions are best explained by analogical
thought involving Btransferring an explanatory structure from one item to the other^, e.g. from
a different domain, rather than by general child animism as originally postulated by Piaget and
others. While there is some evidence that early years teachers have concerns about their own
use of animistic expressions (see Kallery and Psillos 2004), it would be wrong to dismiss the
prevalence of animistic language in children as a ‘nuisance’ in the development of thinking.
Researchers like Petrie (1979) recognised that metaphors generated through storytelling are
actually constructive in relation to the development of scientific thinking. Petrie noted that
Bmetaphor enables one to transfer learning and understanding from what is well-known to
what is less well-known in a vivid and memorable way, thus enhancing learning^ (p. 439). His
argument was that metaphor is one of the main ways of Bleaping the epistemological chasm
between old knowledge and radically new knowledge^ (p. 440). Thus, when children say that
the Sun goes to bed at night or the Moon is sleeping during the day, they are speaking
metaphorically as well as employing personification and analogy between the motions of
heavenly bodies and the daily routines of human beings.
This has been put differently and more emphatically by those who focus upon language and
cultural influences, and we should recognise that children are immersed in traditions which
dwell upon animistic ways of speaking (often in dynamic ways, to anticipate the next section).
An almost daily adult expression in maritime climates is to speak of Bthe Sun trying to break
through the clouds^, which is completely unscientific, but it is what our children hear. Tempted
though, we might be to say, in generalising from such observations, that language moulds the
child, and it is probably more accurate to say that Bit is the language which is already childish^,
as recorded a long time ago by Piaget as follows:
It is true that in everyday life there is often what Stern [sic] has called ‘convergence’ of
the language used by parents towards a childish style of speech. Parents instinctively use
easy expressions of a concrete and even animistic or anthropomorphic nature, so as to
come down to the mental level of the child (Piaget 1926/1959, p. 98).
Nevertheless, some of the animism in the stories which many children regularly hear can
give fairly firm underpinnings to wrong science and enduring misunderstandings. Integral to
stories about Jack Frost, personifying frost and cold weather, nipping children’s fingers and
toes and making fern-like patterns on windows in cold winters, is that cold moves in and about,
not that heat escapes from poorly insulated houses.
Mental Imagery
The role of mental imagery and imagination in the history of science is a little controversial.
Famously, the ring structure of the benzene molecule and its complex bonding is said to have
been revealed to August Kekulé through dynamic imagery in a dream about a snake which bit
its own tail (see Gribben and Gribben 1998). Reacting to the difficulties in comprehending
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developments in physics at the start of the twentieth century, Piaget and Inhelder (1971), cited
Juvet (1933) as having said Bthat it was impossible ‘to carry on [atomic] physics with the
imagination’^, that is with particular reference to the complexity of transformation systems in
atomic physics. However, Einstein held imagery to be one of his own greatest assets using it to
clarify ideas through thought experiments (see Blown and Bryce 2012). And more recently,
Stephen Hawking has been forced through disability to rely on mental imagery to an
unprecedented extent in his drive to solve the deepest problems in cosmology from the origin
of the universe to the nature of black holes (see Bowie 2013).
Psychologists have long recognized that mental imagery in children develops
through the practised remembering of previous perceptions which become, through
time and with particular experiences, (a) progressively more anticipatory in nature and
(b) increasingly more dynamic. Piaget and Inhelder (1971) had noted that images were
essentially static up to roughly the onset of the concrete operational stage, approxi-
mately 7–8 years in most children. However, more recent research, such as that of
Funk et al. (2005) has shown that children as young as 5 years have kinetic imagery
(imagery representing movement) and that at least some features of it are guided by
motor processes. Funk et al. argue that these are (internal, cognitive) mechanisms
involving anticipation, though it remains unclear what is actually involved in the
strategies concerned with imagining external things detached from our own bodies,
like planetary movements. Utilising imaginary experiments where children were asked
to predict when water would reach the rim of a tilted glass, Frick et al. (2009) have
also shown that motor activities are important in supporting children’s mental trans-
formations. Through their investigations, it became clear that there are developmental
trends for dynamic imagery. Notwithstanding such findings, writers like Pylyshyn
(2003) conceded that we have still to understand whether mental images really do
involve the inspection of spatially displayed picture-like objects or whether some
different depiction is involved, that is, whether images are spatial, or representative
in some other form, or analogue.
Static imagery has been studied using methods such as presenting drawings with
incomplete features and asking subjects what they see; dynamic imagery studies have
utilised thought experiments such as mental rotation tasks (see Funk et al. 2005; Piaget
and Inhelder 1971). In order to ask children about their imagery, we used questions like:
When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon did you see any pictures in your
imagination? or Did you see anything moving in your imagination? or When I asked you
about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon and about things moving did you have any
pictures in your mind of things moving? These readily solicit responses. Notwithstanding
Pylyshyn’s cautions, it is clear that an important part of a child’s cognitive maturation is
the bringing together of dynamic imagery and linguistically expressed ideas from either
the everyday or the scientific repertoires of that child’s language. Words and images are
combined to render thinking more powerful, as in the thought experiments either naturally
invoked by adults or quite deliberately used by teachers as part of instruction as well as
those developed by scientists throughout history, many of them being recognised as
significant to the evolution of scientific understanding (see Blown and Bryce 2012). In
the empirical work described later, we give instances of children inter-connecting their
imagined, visual images and their verbalised thoughts. These actions appear to be in
keeping with the re-entry processes described by Edelman (2005) as children simulate
concepts (see Bryce and Blown 2016; Barsalou 2003).
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Research Question and Methodology
The preceding review prompted us to investigate the coexistence of everyday and scientific
language in the area of children’s cosmologies and to gauge the extent of language switching
between the two modes, whether unprompted or triggered by the contextual cues encountered
through Socratic dialogue in Piagetian interviews. Our previous research into children’s
cognitive development in this area has made use of ordinal scales of core concepts (ranging
from less scientific to more scientific). Thus, we reasoned that, as children try to explain
dynamic concepts, switching should (a) be qualitatively apparent in protocols obtained through
interviewing individuals and (b) show quantitatively as increases in concept category means
with age (as measured with Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) two-sample tests), irrespective of the
language mode used in particular instances. We sought also to examine the extent of animism
in children’s responses, its decline (especially during the primary school years) and possible
sources of figurative speech. Specifically then, our research question was as follows: Are both
language modes evident in young children’s responses and is language switching from
everyday language (embedded thinking), including animism, to scientific language
(disembedded thinking)—or vice versa—apparent during interviews?
The methodology used for the research reported here was based on the pioneering work of
Nussbaum andNovak (1976) andNussbaum (1979) and on our own previous investigations (see
Bryce and Blown 2006, 2007, 2012, 2013; Blown and Bryce 2006, 2010, 2012). Our approach
was also deeply influenced by Vygotsky’s thesis which has profound implications for experi-
mental data derived from Piagetian style interviews and Socratic dialogue or any other dialogue
or questionnaire (written or verbal). And this is equally applicable to data derived from
sociolinguistic methods. The authors have long recognised the need for great care in interview
design to reduce the cultural bias of the researcher (particularly in cross-cultural studies) from an
ethnographic perspective. We have also been aware of similar care to avoid restricting dialogue
to the universal culture and language of science. These efforts were applied so as to elicit and
probe children’s own original ideas, expressed in everyday or scientific language (and shades in-
between). Vygotsky’s work implies that no matter how we investigate, by the act of asking a
question, we introduce a linguistic context which constrains or mediates the child’s response.
Importantly, it is vital that the interviewee has a sense of the interviewer’s purposes in relation to
the questions being asked. The researcher must make sure, as best he/she can, that there is a
shared understanding with the child of what the exchange is all about. As Kozulin states B…it is
not just the child’s cognitive competence but also the negotiated sociocultural meaning of the
situation that determines the child’s performance^ (Kozulin 2012, p. xv). The use of alternative
media such as children’s drawings and models is particularly helpful in this regard.
In the case of younger children, initial interviews investigated their concepts of the motion
of the Earth and the apparent motion of the Sun by looking at changes in the shadow of a
shadow stick, and observation of the motion of the Moon through study of its position and
phases. In the main part of the interviews, the children were asked to draw the motion of the
Earth, Sun and Moon and to give explanations for the associated concepts of time (day, year,
month) and daytime/night-time. They then drew and modelled the shape of the Earth, Sun and
Moon and used these to illustrate their dynamic concepts of the motions of these bodies. In
addition to interviews, older children completed a preliminary written questionnaire. Because
they afford the richest source of examples of language mode switching (a phenomenon
difficult to capture in interviews and the principal emphasis of the research described here),
children’s explanations of daytime and night-time are the main focus of the analysis. However,
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the imagery reported (more commonly manifest in children’s explanations and the secondary
emphasis of the research) draws on all of the above areas of children’s knowledge involving
the shape and motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon.
Sample, Surveys and Instruments
There were 539 participants including 356 from New Zealand (171 boys and 185 girls) and
182 from China (99 boys and 84 girls). The children attended local kindergarten, primary and
secondary schools in Wairarapa, Wellington Region, New Zealand, and Changchun, Jilin
Province, (North East) China. The methodology utilised three data-gathering instruments: (a)
for kindergarten, preschool and primary school children (aged 3–12), Piagetian interviews with
three media: verbal language, drawing and play-dough modelling based on an extensive
interview guide (see Bryce and Blown 2012), and (b) for middle school and high school
students (aged 13–18), a written questionnaire inviting responses in writing and drawing
combined with follow-up interviews and play-dough modelling to clarify ideas (see Bryce
and Blown 2012 and Table 2).
Table 2 Survey participants by country, educational group, age, instrument and gender
Group Age (years) Instrument Country Total
New Zealand China
M F Total M F Total
Kindergarten and preschool 3–6 IG 32 25 57 11 12 23 80
Junior primary school 7–9 IG 25 33 58 14 13 27 85
Senior primary school 10–12 IG 41 35 76 9 9 18 94
Middle schoola 13–15 Q + FI 30 37 67 26 23 49 116
High schoolb 16–18 Q + FI 24 36 60 39 27 66 126
NZ pilot kindergarten 3–5 IG 10 9 19 19
NZ pilot junior primary 6–9 IG 9 10 19 19
Total 171 185 356 99 84 183 539
The interview guide, questionnaire and follow-up interview covered a wide range of topics on the motion and
shape of the Earth, Sun and Moon (ESM); associated concepts of time; daytime and night-time; and gravity
concepts utilising thought experiments about dropped and thrown balls, falling water and the path of a ball
dropped into a hole through the Earth. Older children also studied seasons and eclipses. Language mode
switching was apparent in all studies but was most evident in ESM motion studies particularly day/night studies.
For this reason, the latter are reported in greater detail (see Tables 3 and 4). Some younger children did not
participate in all studies so the number of participants in each study differed. The table above shows those
children who participated in most of the ESM motion studies
M male, F female, IG interview guide (Piagetian structured interview with Socratic dialogue), Q written
questionnaire (main points from interview guide), FI follow-up interview (probing responses with Socratic
dialogue)
aMiddle school (China) = junior secondary (NZ)
bHigh school (China) = senior secondary (NZ)
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Data Analysis, Categorisation and Coding
The data from New Zealand and China were initially analysed, categorised and coded by the
first author using a modified version of the cosmological concept categorisation scheme
developed by the researchers (see Bryce and Blown 2006). The individual elements of the
scheme included concepts of the motion and shape of the Earth, Sun and Moon; associated
concepts of time; concepts of daytime and night-time; identity with and habitation of the Earth;
and gravity. The coding instrument of each element consisted of an ordinal scale of concepts
from least scientific (category 1) to most scientific (category 10), each concept being identified
by a descriptor and illustrated by a thumbnail sketch (see Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 for modified
versions of the scheme for Earth motion, Sun motion, Moon motion and daytime/night-time
concepts). Where appropriate, elements were investigated by multi-media triangulation using
interviews, drawing and play-dough modelling. Extension studies included investigation of the
shape and motion of the planets of the Solar System, seasons and tides (see Appendices in
Bryce and Blown 2006). The data were analysed using the K-S two-sample test (alpha level
0.05) for comparison of category means between groups.
The written and verbal data from China were translated and transcribed by two interpreters/
research assistants who were familiar with the research methodology. The data were then
analysed, categorised and coded in the same way as the data from New Zealand.
The cosmological concept categorisation scheme has been checked over a period of years by
two astronomy educators with a wide experience in astronomy education from the Carter
National Observatory, Wellington (see Bryce and Blown 2006, 2007, 2013; Blown and Bryce
Table 3 Frequency of intra-modal switching (within language modality) in day/night concepts
Age group Age NZ China
f/na % f/n %
Kindergarten and preschool 3–5 3/24 12 3/22 14
Junior primary school 6–8 7/28 25 6/27 22
Senior primary school 9–12 4/21 19 3/18 17
Junior secondary (middle) school 13–15 1/66 2 1/49 2
Senior secondary (high) school 16–18 1/51 2 3/66 4
a Frequency of concept category divided by the number in the age group sampled
Table 4 Frequency of inter-modal switching (across language, drawing and modelling) in day/night concepts
Age group Age NZ China
f/n % f/n %
Kindergarten and preschool 3–5 5/24 21 4/22 18
Junior primary school 6–8 5/28 18 4/27 15
Senior primary school 9–12 2/21 10 3/18 17
Junior secondary (middle) school 13–15 4/66 6 4/49 8
Senior secondary (high) school 16–18 1/51 2 3/66 4
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2006, 2010). Exemplars for each category of the conceptual elements in each culture in the three
media and their associated representing modalitieswere selected in each case. These represented
approximately 20 % of the data with 538 participants. The results verified the categorisation
scheme with an inter-coder agreement of 92–96 %; Cohen’s kappa (κ) = 0.92 to 0.94.
Findings
The main data was in the form of verbal responses to interview questions asked of children
aged 3–12 years and written responses to a questionnaire administered to older children aged
13–18 years, the latter being followed up by verbal questioning guided by the principles of
Socratic dialogue. In addition, data were derived from children’s drawings and play-dough
models. Thus, the data were essentially qualitative in nature as represented in the sample
protocols which follow. These responses were then categorised using the aforementioned
scheme (see Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4), frequencies expressed as percentages determined and group
comparisons across media and cultures analysed using K-S two-sample tests. The samples
cited here have been chosen to give a spread of ethnicities, gender and age together with
everyday and scientifically expressed ideas.
RQ: Are both language modes evident in young children’s responses and is language
switching from everyday language (embedded thinking), including animism, to scientific
language (disembedded thinking)—or vice versa—apparent during interviews?
Although, in general, there was consistency of dynamic concepts within and across media
and their associated modalities in keeping with the theory of conceptual coherence (see Blown
and Bryce 2010), there was substantial evidence of children using both everyday and scientific
language. There was also evidence of language mode switching from embedded to
10.   Earth planet in space - Rotates (spins) on axis; Revolves in orbit around Sun or around
Sun and Moon; Drawing: Spin indicated by axis of rotation and/or motion arrow(s)
9.   Earth planet in space - Revolves in orbit around Sun; Does not spin or spin uncertain
8.   Earth planet or ball-shaped object in space - Rotates (spins) on axis; Does not revolve
(orbit) around Sun; Drawing: Spin indicated by axis and/or motion arrow(s)
7.    Earth planet or ball-shaped object - Located in space or sky; Rotation (spin) and
Revolution (orbit) around Sun uncertain; e.g., Moves continuously in some way; e.g., 
“from East to West”, or “round and round”, or “with the wind”, or “across sky”, or “rolls”
6.   Earth of uncertain nature - Located in space or sky; Stationary or motion uncertain
5.   Earth flat or disc-shaped or uncertain - Location also uncertain; Moves continuously in
some way; e.g., “round and round”, or “up and down”, or “horizontally”, or “rises and
sets”, or “moves around in circles”, or “moves across sky”; Follows us when we move 
4.   Earth of uncertain nature - Location also uncertain; Motion irregular, or intermittent, or
indirect, or uncertain, e.g., “only moves at night-time”, or “trees move in the wind”
3.   Earth animate: moves just like a person who “walks”, “runs”, “sleeps at night”; Does not
spin at night “because it is tired”; “rolls”, “lands on ground”, “flies”, “follows us”
2.   Earth flat (slab, disc, pancake) or uncertain in nature - Location also uncertain; Stationary;
Moves only during earthquakes; Drawing: Ground horizontal below; sky horizontal above
1.   Uncertain of motion or nature or meaning of Earth - Not sure if/how Earth moves
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Fig. 1 Ordinal scale for Earth motion concept categories
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disembedded repertoires and, in some cases, the reverse. Two distinct forms of switching were
detected (although they become inter-twined through re-entry processes) (see Bryce and
Blown 2016; Edelman 2005). The first kind is the familiar intra-modal one of verbal language
where a child switches between everyday and scientific language. The second kind is the less
common inter-modal one that we have detected through our multi-modal approach whereby
children switch between verbal language, drawing and play-dough simulations of a concept
such as the cause of daytime and night-time (see Barsalou 2003). Verbal intra-modal switching
changes can be detected by close examination of verbal responses to interview questions and
quantified using our cosmological concept categorisation scheme (see Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4).
These can be compared to responses from drawing and play-dough modelling modalities to
look for inter-modal switching by comparing responses from category bands (animistic, semi-
animistic, everyday, semi-scientific and scientific, see Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4; Table 4).
Protocol Examples
The following are protocol samples of the written questionnaire answers and verbal interview
responses. Although we have identified protocol participants by culture (China and New
Zealand (NZ)), ethnicity (NZ European, NZ Māori and Chinese Han), gender (male and
female) and age (in years and months) for the interest of readers, we have restricted our
analysis to culture (country). We have done so because our previous studies indicated a little
variation between ethnicities and genders. Researcher’s (R) questions are indicated in bold,
10.    Sun star in space - Parent body of Solar System; Earth and/or planets revolve around
Sun; Sun revolves around centre of Milky Way; May rotate (spin) on axis
9.      Sun star in space - Parent body of Solar System; Earth and/or planets revolve around
Sun; Sun rotates on axis and revolves or moves in galaxy/universe/space in some way
(other than around centre of Milky Way/Galaxy) 
8.     Sun star in space - Sun rotates or revolves in some way; e.g., moves outwards from Big
Bang, while Earth and/or planets revolve around Sun 
7.     Sun ball-shaped or disc-shaped object - Located in space or sky; Stationary but may
“wobble” as a result of gravitational interaction with planets; Earth and/or planets
revolve around Sun; May appear to move because Earth moves (relative motion)
6.     Sun ball-shaped or disc-shaped object - Located in space or sky; Sun moves in some
way; e.g., rotates and/or revolves independently of motion of Earth; Revolves around
Earth; or around Earth and Moon; or around Moon; or with Moon around Earth
5.     Sun ball-shaped or disc-shaped object - Located in space or sky; Stationary
4.     Sun ball-shaped or disc-shaped - Located in sky; Moves in some way (Geocentric); e.g.,
“rises in East, sets in West”, or “moves up and down”, or “moves across sky”; or motion
uncertain; e.g., “Only in daytime”, or “appears in daytime”, or “Goes away at night” 
3.     Sun ball-shaped or disc-shaped object in sky - Moves by relative motion; e.g., “Appears
to move because we move”, or “Sun appears to follow us when we walk, or “Wind
makes Sun move by moving trees”, or “moves in and out of clouds”, or “by magic”
2.     Sun of uncertain nature. Located in sky or in sea or on ground - Moves in some way;
e.g., “up and down”; Animate with face or spikes; e.g., “Sun has eyes that can move”; 
Can “fly like a bird”; “Swims through the sky”, “Goes to bed (home) at night-time”
1.     Uncertain of motion, or nature of “Sun”; Not sure of what Sun is or if/how Sun moves
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Fig. 2 Ordinal scale for Sun motion concept categories
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italic font and children’s (C) responses are indicated in plain, italic font. Following each
illustration, statements are made [in square brackets] to indicate the switching of categories
which individuals made in the course of their explanations. For example, daytime/night-time
categories 1–4 represent everyday-animistic and semi-animistic ideas, 5–7 represent everyday
non-animistic ideas and 8–10 represent scientific ideas (see Fig. 4). Hence, a move from
categories 3 to 8 would indicate a switch from everyday to scientific thinking, as in the switch
from BIn daytime the Moon and Sun swap places^ (category 3) to BDaytime and night-time are
caused by the Earth spinning^ (category 8).
(a) Examples of switching between coexisting ‘everyday’ and ‘scientific’ repertoires and vice
versa
Responses to questionnaire: NZ
Rhiannon (NZ European: female, aged 13 years and 5 months)
Questions on daytime and night-time:
R: What is daytime?
C: The Sun is on that part of the world—the Sun is shining.
10.   Moon planet-like object - Natural satellite of Earth; Rotates (spins) on axis and revolves around
Earth as Earth revolves around Sun; Gravitational pull of Sun and Moon causes tides on Earth.
Tidally locked with Earth; period of rotation = period of revolution; “same side faces Earth”
9.      Moon planet-like object - Located in space or sky; Revolves around Earth as Earth revolves
around Sun, or around Earth and Sun, or Moon and Sun revolve around Earth, or Moon
revolves around Earth as Sun revolves around Moon
8.     Moon planet-like object - Located in space or sky; Moon does not revolve around Earth but
moves with Earth as Earth revolves around Sun, or Moon revolves around Sun, or Earth and
Moon revolve around Sun; Moon may rotate (spin)
7.     Moon planet-like object - Located in space or sky; Moon does not revolve around Earth but
remains stationary as Earth revolves around Sun, or Sun revolves around Earth, or Earth spins
Moon may rotate (spin)
6.      Moon planet-like object - Located in space or sky; Earth revolves around Moon, or around Sun
and Moon
5.     Moon planet-like object - Located in space or sky; Moves in some way; e.g., “Rises in East
and sets in West”, or “rolls”, or “spins”,  or moves “up and down”, or “across the sky”,
or revolves “in a circle”, or “in circles”; “Comes out at night-time”, or “moves at night-time”
4.     Moon ball-shaped, or disc-shaped, or curved, or semi-circular object. - Located in space or
sky; Stationary or motion uncertain or intermittent; e.g., “Comes out when it is dark”, “Only
moves at night-time”, “Moon appears at night-time”; May “change to”, or be “replaced by”,
or be “covered by” Sun or Earth
3.    Moon object of uncertain nature - Located in space or sky; Stationary but appears to move (by
relative motion); e.g., “Moon moves when we move”; “Moon appears to follow us when we
walk, or drive, or go in a boat”, or moves because of wind and/or relative to other objects in sky
or atmosphere; e.g., “clouds push Moon”, “moves because of Sun”
2.      Moon object of uncertain nature - Located in sky; Animate; e.g., “Sleeps” during the day,
“Plays” at night, “Gets up when the Sun goes to bed”, “Gives out light when Sun goes to bed”,
“Walks across sky”; Moves in some way; e.g., “Rolls along ground”; May move by “magic”,
or by “Sand-man”, or because “Jesus pushes it”
1.       Uncertain of motion or nature or meaning of “Moon” - Not sure of what Moon is or if/how Moon
moves
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Fig. 3 Ordinal scale for Moon motion concept categories
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R: What happens to the Earth in daytime?
C: It is light.
10. Earth is ball-shaped; rotates on axis in a day; revolves around Sun in a year
When Western hemisphere is in sunlight (daytime), Eastern hemisphere is in
darkness (night-time)
Moon shines by reflected sunlight (day and night); revolves around Earth in a month
Drawing: Night-time shaded or indicated; rotation arrows; orbits
9.  Earth is ball-shaped and revolves around the Sun
Moon is ball-shaped and revolves around the Earth
The side of the Earth facing the Sun has daytime
The side of the Earth facing away from the Sun has night-time
Drawing: Night-time shaded or indicated and orbits (optional)
8.   Earth is ball-shaped and may rotate (spin) on axis
Sun and/or Moon appears to revolve around the Earth in a day
Sun and/or Moon moves from East to West across the sky
Daytime is the period between sunrise and sunset
Night-time is the period between sunset and sunrise
7.  Earth is ball-shaped. Rotation and/or Revolution uncertain
Earth revolves (or appears to revolve) around Sun in a day
The side of the Earth facing the Sun has daytime
The side of the Earth facing away from the Sun has night-time
The Moon is on the opposite side of the Earth from the Sun
6.   In daytime it is light and/or sunny because the Sun is shining on our side of the Earth
At night-time it is dark because the Sun is shining on the other side of the Earth
When we have daytime the other side of the Earth has night-time
At night-time the Moon shines on the dark side of the Earth
Sun “Goes to other countries at night-time”; Moon “goes to other countries in daytime”
Sun rises and Moon sets in daytime; Sun sets and Moon rises at night-time
5.   Non-animistic ideas involving "covering" by the Sun and Moon; e.g., 
In daytime “the Moon is behind the Sun"; at night-time “the Sun is behind the Moon"
In daytime “the Sun blocks the Moon”; at night-time “the Moon blocks out the Sun"
Sun “appears in daytime”; “disappears at night-time”
Moon “goes away (disappears) in daytime”; “appears (comes out) at night -time”
Confuses night-time with Solar Eclipse
4.  Semi-animistic ideas involving "hiding”
Daytime and night-time related to the Sun and Moon being hidden by clouds or other
atmospheric or astronomical objects; e.g., "In daytime the Moon hides behind clouds"; 
"At night-time the Sun hides behind clouds"
3.   Animistic ideas involving "changing into" or "replacement" or "switching places" or
"swapping places"; e.g., "In daytime the Moon changes into the Sun"; "At night-time the
Sun changes into the Moon"; "In daytime the Moon and Sun swap places"
2.  Animistic ideas with daytime and night-time related to activities of animate Earth, Sun
and Moon; e.g.,
"In daytime the Sun shines and the Moon sleeps”; "At night-time, after
the Sun has gone to bed, the Moon gets up to play and give out light" ;
“At night-time the Earth is sleeping”
Moon “goes home in daytime”; Sun “goes home at night-time”
1.  Simple observations; e.g., “The Sun comes out in daytime”; “In daytime it’s sunny”; 
“At night-time it’s dark and/or cold”; “The Moon comes out at night-time”;
“The Sun goes behind the clouds (hills, mountains) at night-time”;
“The Moon goes behind the clouds (hills, mountains) in daytime”;
“The Sun goes to the bottom of the Earth at night-time”;
“The Moon goes to the bottom of the Earth in daytime”
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Fig. 4 Ordinal scale for daytime and night-time concept categories
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R: What happens to the Sun in daytime?
C: It is shining and awake.
R: What happens to the Moon in daytime?
C: It sleeps.
[An intra-modal (within language modality) switch from daytime/night-time language
concept category 6 (semi-scientific: the Sun is shining on part of the Earth) to daytime/
night-time concept category 1 (simple observation: it is light) to daytime/night-time concept
category 2 (animistic: the Sun is awake; the Moon sleeps), also classified as Sun motion
concept category 2 and Moon motion concept category 2] (see Figs. 2, 3 and 4)
Drawing of the Earth, Sun and Moon in daytime and night-time In both cases,
Rhiannon showed the Earth, the Sun and the Moon scientifically but with everyday-
animistic captions.
[An inter-modal (across language and drawing modalities) switch from daytime/night-time
language concept category 9 (scientific: the Earth rotating on axis) to daytime/night-time
concept category 2 (animistic: the Moon sleeping in daytime; the Sun sleeping at night-time)]
(see Fig. 4)
Drawing of the Earth, Sun and Moon in daytime C: In her daytime drawing, Rhiannon
drew the Moon with caption Bzzz^ to represent sleeping (see Fig. 5a(i)).
[An intra-modal (within drawing modality) switch from daytime/night-time drawing con-
cept category 9 (scientific: the Earth rotating on axis with night-time shaded) to daytime/night-
time concept category 2 (animistic: the Moon sleeping)] (see Fig. 4)
R: What is night-time?
C: When the Sun is not shining.
R: What happens to the Earth at night-time?
C: It goes dark on one side.
R: What happens to the Sun at night-time?
C: It goes to sleep.
R: What happens to the Moon at night-time?
C: It comes into the sky.
[An intra-modal (within language modality) switch from daytime/night-time language
concept category 1 (simple observation: the Sun is not shining) to daytime/night-time concept
category 6 (everyday-semi-scientific: one side of the Earth goes dark) to daytime/night-time
concept category 2 (animistic: the Sun sleeping) to daytime/night-time concept category 1
(simple observation: the Moon rises)] (see Fig. 4)
Drawing of the Earth, Sun and Moon at night-time C: Drew the Earth on axis; the Sun
with caption Bzzz^ to represent sleeping (see Fig. 5a(ii)).
[An intra-modal (within drawing modality) switch from daytime/night-time drawing con-
cept category 9 (scientific: the Earth rotating on axis with night-time shaded) to daytime/night-
time concept category 2 (animistic: the Sun sleeping)] (see Fig. 4)
Similarly in China, Li Jin Zhu drew the Earth, Sun and Moon scientifically but with
animistic annotations (see Fig. 5b). These examples illustrate that (a) switching can take place
in both directions, everyday to scientific and scientific to everyday; (b) switching can take
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place between verbal and drawing modes; and (c) animism can be represented pictorially as
well as verbally.
Li Jin Zhu (China: Han: female, aged 5 years and 9 months)
R: What happens to the Earth at night-time?
C: The Earth falls asleep (see Fig. 5b).
R: What happens to the Sun at night-time?
Fig. 5 a (i) Daytime drawing: Rhiannon (NZ European: female, aged 13 years and 5 months) said that daytime
is when BThe sun is shining on that part of the world^; in daytime, the Earth is Blight^, the Sun is Bawake^ and
the Moon Bsleeps^, which she indicates by Bzzz^ on her drawing. Note that the Earth has an axis of rotation, the
surface of the Earth has features (continents and oceans), the night-time side of the Earth is shade and the Moon is
smaller than the Earth and appears to be in the orbit around the Earth. Thus, her drawing combines both everyday
and scientific concepts. a (ii) Night-time drawing: Rhiannon said that night-time is when BThe Sun is not
shinning on that part of the world^; at night-time, the Earth Bgoes dark on one side^, the Sun Bgoes to sleep^ and
the Moon Bcomes out into the sky .^ In this case, she indicated the Sun sleeping by Bzzz^ on her drawing. As with
her daytime, drawing combines both everyday and scientific concepts. b Daytime and night-time drawing: Li Jin
Zhu (China: Han: female, aged 5 years and 9 months) said that daytime is BThis moment^; in daytime, the Earth
Bwakes up^, the Sun is BHanging in the sky^ and the Moon Bsets behind the hill and goes to sleep^. Night-time is
Bwhen in gets dark^, and the Moon Balso falls asleep at night time but it hangs in the sky and the cloud is its
cover^, which she indicates by closed eyes of the Earth, Sun and Moon in her drawing. Note: The researcher’s
interpreter labelled the drawing following Li Jin Zhu’s instructions
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C: It sleeps at the foot of the hill.
R: What happens to the Moon at night-time?
C: The Moon also falls asleep at night-time but it hangs in the sky and the cloud is its
cover.
[An inter-modal (across language and drawing modalities) switch from daytime/night-time
language concept category 2 (animistic: the Earth, Sun and Moon sleep) to daytime/night-
time drawing concept category 6 (everyday-semi-scientific: dual Earth concept: one
synonymous with ground; the other planet like in space/sky; the Sun and Moon associated
with the Earth in space/sky) to daytime/night-time language concept category 2 (animistic:
drawing captions show the Earth, Sun and Moon sleeping), also classified as Earth motion
concept category 3, Sun motion concept category 2 and Moon motion concept category 2]
(see Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4)
(b) Examples of switching between coexisting everyday and scientific repertoires and vice
versa Responses to questionnaire: China
R: What is a year?
Niu Sheng Shuang (China: Han: female, aged 17 years and 11 months)
According to an old legend, there was a monster called ‘Year’ who ate lots of people
then was killed. According to science, a year starts from spring and ends in winter or
from January to December.
[Time interview: a switch from Beveryday-cultural^ to scientific concept categories]
Switching was also evident in play-dough modelling. For example, it was not uncommon
for children to change the shape of their models of the shape of the Earth from disc-shaped to
ball-shaped as a result of Socratic dialogue. These changes in shape had implications for Earth
motion and daytime/night-time concepts since a complete (scientific) understanding of the
cause of the daytime/night-time cycle depends on knowing that the Earth is spherical (see
Bryce and Blown 2016).
(c) Examples of switching between coexisting scientific and everyday repertoires
Interview responses
Aidan (NZ European: male, aged 7 years and 2 months)
R: Tell me about the Sun?
C: It’s a star.
R: Where is the Sun?
C: In space—because it’s a star.
R: Is the sun moving?
C: Yes.
R: How is the Sun moving?
C: It’s moving slowly.
R: Why is the Sun moving?
C: Because of the wind.
R: The wind blows the Sun, does it?
C: Yes.
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[An intra-modal (within language modality) switch from Sun motion concept category 8
(scientific) to Sun motion concept category 3 (semi-animistic)] (see Fig. 2)
Tipene (NZ Māori: male, aged 11 years and 4 months)
R: What makes daytime and night-time?
C: It goes around.
R: What goes around?
C: The Earth.
R: What happens to the Moon at night-time?
C: It goes to sleep.
R: Where does it go to sleep?
C: Behind the mountains.
R: Do you think it really goes to sleep?
C: No.
R: Why do you say it goes to sleep?
C: I forgot (myself).
[An intra-modal (within language modality) switch from daytime/night-time concept
category 8 (scientific) to daytime/night-time concept category 2 (animistic) and back
to everyday language, also classified as Moon motion concept category 2] (see Figs. 3
and 4)
[When questioned about the sources of his ideas about the Earth, Sun and Moon (such as
the Moon sleeping), Tipene said that his Mum and Dad told him stories about them].
Li Xin (China: Han: female, aged 8 years and 9 months)
R: Tell me about the Earth?
C: The Earth is round like a ball and many people live on the surface of it. There are
many countries on the Earth.
R: Is the Earth moving?
C: Yes.
R: Why is the Earth moving?
C: It follows us.
R: [Earlier child said that the Sun followed us].
R: Is it the same as the Sun?
C: Yes.
[An intra-modal (within language modality) switch from Earth motion concept category 7
(semi-scientific) to Earth motion concept category 3 (animistic)] (see Fig. 1)
Bradley (NZ Māori: male, aged 9 years and 6 months)
R: What is daytime?
C: Daytime is when half the world would be away from (the Sun) and the other half
would be towards (the Sun). [Daytime/night-time category 6]
R: Why is there daytime?
C: We have to have daytime so we won’t get lost in the darkness. [Daytime/night-time
category 1]
R: What is night-time?
C: Night-time is when one side (of the Earth) is dark and the other side (of the Earth) has
got light. [Daytime/night-time category 6]
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R: Why is there night-time?
C: So you can rest and regain energy. [Daytime/night-time category 1]
R: What happens to the Earth at night-time?
C: It still rotates with the Moon on one side and the Sun on the other side where it is
daylight. [Daytime/night-time category 9]
[Bradley represents a relatively rare case of a child alternating freely between everyday and
scientific repertoires. Usually, children switch from everyday to scientific modes as a result of
probing and Socratic dialogue. But, Bradley switches from scientific freely, without probing,
to everyday then back to scientific then everyday and finally scientific.]
Viane (NZ Māori: female, aged 9 years and 1 month)
R: What is night-time?
C: It’s when the Sun goes down and the Moon comes up and it’s all lit up.
R: What happens to the Earth at night-time?
C: It spins round—it moves slowly.
R: What happens to the Sun at night?
It goes away for a while then it loses its sunshine and goes to sleep.
[Viane is an example of a child displaying inter-modal switching across language, drawing
and play-dough modelling modalities. Her daytime/night-time concept by verbal language as
in the interview extract was category 2 (animistic), by drawing (category 7, semi-scientific)
and by play-dough modelling (category 6, everyday). Sun animism also classified as Sun
motion concept category 2] (see Figs. 2 and 4)
Caitlin R. (NZ European: female, aged 4 years and 7 months)
R: What happens to the Sun at night?
C: The Sun goes away.
R: Where does it go away to?
C: Its home.
R: Where’s its home?
C: Somewhere else…
R: What does the Sun do when it gets to its home at night?
C: It goes to sleep.
R: What does the Moon do in daytime?
C: It goes back to sleep again (yawns, a pretend yawn).
[An intra-modal (within language modality) switch from daytime/night-time concept cate-
gory 6 (everyday-semi-scientific: the Sun goes away (to other countries) at night-time) to
daytime/night-time concept category 2 (animistic: the Sun goes to sleep at home), also
classified as Sun motion concept category 2 and Moon motion concept category 2] (see
Figs 2, 3 and 4)
Wang Yuan Yuan (China: Han: female, aged 8 years and 1 month)
R: What happens to the Earth at night-time?
C: It sleeps.
R: How does the Earth sleep?
C: It stops spinning.
R: Where does the Earth sleep?
C: In the sky.
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[An intra-modal (within language modality) switch from Earth motion concept category 3
(animistic: the Earth sleeps) to Earth motion concept category 8 (scientific: the Earth spins)]
(see Fig. 1)
Li Zhong Qi (China: Han: male, aged 5 years and 3 months)
R: What happens to the Moon in daytime?
C: The Moon goes back to its home in daytime but I don’t know where it goes.
R: What is night-time?
C: It gets dark at night-time. The Moon appears and the Sun goes back to its home.
R: What happens to the Sun at night-time?
C: The Sun sets at the foot of the hills.
[Li Zhong Qi is another example of a child displaying inter-modal switching. His daytime/
night-time concept by interview was category 2 (animistic), his drawing was classified as
category 5 (non-animistic involving covering by the Sun and Moon) and his play-dough
modelling was rated category 1 (everyday simple observations), also classified as Sun motion
concept category 2 and Moon motion concept category 2] (see Figs 2, 3 and 4)
[Discussion: The idea that the Sun or Moon sets, or goes to rest, or sleeps, at the foot of, or
behind, the hills or mountains is common to children in New Zealand and China. Mountains
and hills surround Wairarapa, yet there are no mountains or hills visible in Changchun on the
Northeast China Plain, raising the question of where these notions come from if not from
personal experience based on observation (see main discussion).
When questioned more deeply about their animistic ideas, children sometimes give reac-
tions which indicate that they are Bthinking in two worlds^ (see Solomon 1983a, b, c): in this
case, one world is the cultural world of young children with its fairy tales, nursery rhymes and
children’s books; many of which do give human characteristics to the Sun and Moon in words
and in illustrations. And the other world is that of adults, not necessarily scientifically inclined
ones. It is as if, by probing deeper, one is waking the child up from one world (a dream like
one) to the other world (the wide awake one).]
Quantitative Data
Turning to the quantitative data derived from the protocols, Table 3 shows the frequency of
intra-modal switching. The results indicate that intra-modal switching (within the verbal
language modality) is less common in the early years when children’s language tends to be
animistic or everyday rather than scientific: kindergarten and preschool (aged 3–5): NZ (12 %)
and China (14 %). The frequency of intra-modal switching is at a maximum in the junior
primary school years (aged 6–8): NZ (25 %) and China (22 %) when children predominantly
use everyday and scientific language interchangeably. The frequency of switching drops
slightly in the senior primary school (aged 9–12): NZ (19 %) and China (17 %), where
everyday and scientific concepts coexist and compete as explanatory repertoires. Language
mode switching is relatively rare at secondary level (2–4 %) where the scientific view
dominates teaching in both cultures.
While Table 4 depicts the frequency of inter-modal switching, it can be seen that the
frequency of switching across language, drawing and play-dough modelling modalities gen-
erally decreases with age. The percentage values range from 21 % in kindergarten and
preschool to 2 % in senior secondary school in NZ and from 18 % in kindergarten and
644 Res Sci Educ (2017) 47:621–653
preschool to 4 % in high school in China. The reason for the slightly higher figure for senior
primary school in China over senior primary school in NZ is probably due to differences in
familiarity with the media: e.g. NZ children having greater opportunity to draw (see Bryce and
Blown 2012) which would influence their ability to maximise that modality. Although treated
as separate modalities, drawing and play-dough modelling were mediated by language. The
interview was based on verbal questions from an extensive interview guide (for younger
children) and a written questionnaire (for older children). For example, children were asked to
draw the Earth, Sun and Moon at daytime and night-time; to make the shape of the Earth, Sun
and Moon in play-dough; to model the motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon; and to model
daytime and night-time with their models. As shown in the protocols, during these activities,
they were asked questions about what they were doing. Older children were also asked about
their written responses and invited to explain their drawings and modelling. Thus, verbal
language was the dominant modality as it is in everyday life. Hence, our focus is on language
mode switching as the primary source in intra-modal and inter-modal switching.
Table 5 illustrates the proportions of daytime and night-time concepts in each category
(animistic and semi-animistic; everyday, non-animistic; scientific and semi-scientific). The
results show animistic and semi-animistic concepts declining with age and gradually being
replaced by (or coexisting with) everyday, non-animistic concepts and, finally, scientific
concepts. The pattern is similar in both cultures. However, in general, a higher percentage of
NZ children held animistic concepts: kindergarten and preschool (NZ 33 %; China 30 %),
junior primary school (NZ 21 %; China 19 %) and senior primary school (NZ 14 %; China
6 %). And a higher number of China secondary school students held animistic or semi-
animistic concepts: junior secondary school (NZ 3 %; China 8 %) and senior secondary school
(NZ 0 %; China 5 %).
Figure 6 shows the latter results diagrammatically as the percentage of children’s responses
to questions about daytime and night-time featuring animism by age group. The decline with
age is readily apparent, but the proportions of pupils in secondary school still resorting to
animism is equally striking (up to 8 %). Variations in the acquisition of everyday-non-animistic
and scientific concepts are attributed to cultural and educational factors.
Table 5 Proportions of children’s daytime and night-time concepts in each category by age groups
Age group Age Daytime and night-time interview concept category
D/N 2–4a
Animistic and
semi-animistic
D/N 5–7
Everyday-
non-animistic
D/N 8–10
Scientific and
semi-scientific
NZ China NZ China NZ China
f/n % f/n % f/n % f/n % f/n % f/n %
Kindergarten and preschool 3–5 8/24 33 7/23 30 5/24 21 10/23 43 2/24 8 1/23 4
Junior primary 6–8 6/28 21 5/27 19 12/28 43 13/27 48 9/28 32 10/27 37
Senior primary 9–12 3/21 14 1/18 6 9/21 43 8/18 44 10/21 48 8/18 44
Junior secondary 13–15 2/66 3 4/49 8 23/66 35 15/49 31 40/66 61 27/49 55
Senior secondary 16–18 0/51 0 3/66 5 15/51 29 15/66 23 36/51 71 49/66 74
a See Fig. 4
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Table 6 shows the results of the K-S tests comparing concepts of daytime and night-time
across cultures. The category mean figures (M) illustrate the development of these with age
(mean values rising from approx. 3 or 4 on our ordinal scale (c.f. Fig. 4) at kindergarten stages
to more than 8 at senior secondary/high school stages) and the move from everyday-animistic
through everyday-semi-animistic to scientific concepts in New Zealand and China.
Table 7 gives details of responses to questions about mental imagery as follows:
1. When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon, did you think of any stories you have
been told about them?
2. Did you see any words (in your imagination)?
3. Did you see any pictures (in your imagination)?
4. Did you see anything moving (in your imagination)?
For those children who indicated that the Earth and/or the Sun and/or the Moon moved:
5. When I asked you about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon and about things moving,
did you have any pictures in your mind of things moving?
These were used to investigate the hypothesis that when children access alternative
everyday and scientific language repertoires in memory, they also access alternative static
and dynamic images as an integral part of conscious and unconscious re-entrant processes (see
Bryce and Blown 2016). Static imagery refers to children imagining pictures of the Earth, Sun
and Moon, whereas dynamic imagery refers to children visualising the motion of these bodies
(both being relevant to children’s concepts of daytime and night-time). It can be seen that both
static and dynamic imagery increase with age: pictures of the Earth, Sun and Moon increasing
from 40 % in NZ kindergarten and preschool to 70 % in NZ senior primary school and from
45 % in China primary and preschool to 76 % in China senior primary school. Similarly, with
motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon, there was an increase from 40 % in NZ kindergarten and
preschool to 70 % in NZ senior primary school and from 45 % in China primary and preschool
to 82 % in China senior primary school. These changes suggest that skill in accessing and
manipulating images is related to the growth of scientific language. We are currently unable to
answer Pylyshyn’s (2003) question about the nature of such images: whether they are spatial
Fig. 6 Percentage of children’s
responses featuring animism in
particular age ranges concerning
daytime and night-time concepts
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pictures or some other forms of representation or whether they may be non-representational
(see Bryce and Blown 2016), but we have suggestions for further research.
Conclusions and Discussion
First, the evidence from children’s responses to questions about the shape and motion of the
Earth, Sun and Moon, and their explanations for daytime and night-time, indicates the
coexistence of everyday and scientific language: the former grounded or embedded in cultural
Table 6 Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing concepts of day and night across cultures
Group Number M SD p value
NZ kindergarten and preschool pupils 24 3.25 2.44 >0.10
China kindergarten and preschool pupils 23 3.65 2.30
NZ junior primary school pupils 28 6.29 3.07 >0.10
China junior primary school pupils 27 5.85 2.23
NZ senior primary school pupils 21 7.29 1.90 >0.10
China senior primary school pupils 18 7.50 2.75
NZ junior secondary school students 66 7.92 2.08 >0.10
China middle school students 49 7.06 2.74
NZ senior secondary school students 51 8.43 1.88 <0.10
China high school students 66 8.26 1.86
There were no significant differences between the two cultures as shown by the p values. Rather than calculate an
actual p value, the K-S test reports the region of a calculated probability. Hence, p < 0.10 means that the actual
value is between 0.10 and 0.05, whereas p > 0.10 simply means that the actual value is greater than 0.10. In all
five cases here, since the actual p level is greater than 0.05, one can conclude that the test is not significant at an
alpha level of 0.05. Inspection of the category means column (M) shows that they tended to increase with age in
both cultures
Table 7 Details of responses to mental imagery questions
Group Static imagery Dynamic imagery
Pictures of ESM Motion of ESM
f/na % f/na %
NZ kindergarten and preschool 4/10 40 4/10 40
China kindergarten and preschool 5/11 45 5/11 45
NZ junior primary school 8/14 57 7/14 50
China junior primary school 8/15 53 9/15 60
NZ senior primary school 7/10 70 7/10 70
China senior primary school 13/17 76 14/17 82
Static imagery = pictures of the Earth, Sun andMoon; dynamic imagery = images of the motion of the Earth, Sun
and Moon
aOnly those children who had concepts of the Earth, Sun and Moon were asked specific imagery questions
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context and the latter unfettered or disembedded as applied in the universal language of
science. The evidence also suggests that these alternative repertoires are bonded to con-
cepts—the strength of the bond being dependent on the concept-skill of the child. This
concept-skill manifests as an ability to recreate or simulate (to use Barsalou’s 2003 term) a
concept such as the motion of the Earth consistently through a variety of media (verbal
language, drawing, play-dough modelling). Investigations such as those undertaken in the
current study suggest that imagery plays an important role in building concept-skill, particu-
larly dynamic modes.
Second, there is also some evidence (hard won since it is difficult to capture under open-
ended interview conditions) of switching between everyday and scientific language modes
instantaneously. These instances suggest switching between alternative images such as in
explaining sunset. That these are not ‘slips-of-the-tongue’ is borne out by supporting evidence
from drawings and play-dough models—modes of representation that take time to recreate,
suggesting that some reference image is being used as a model for the recreation at that
particular time, but more dynamic and plastic than a mental model (see Bryce and Blown
2016). This was particularly evident in instances in our research where children would evidently
change their minds and remodel their ongoing construction to correspond to what they had
previously said or drawn, e.g. a 7-year-old child altering her ball-shaped Sun to add spikes to it
then scrapping that to create a disc shape. She had at least three concepts in mind (approximately
the scientific version, the storybook version and the everyday version) and settled on one.
It must be remembered that these two main findings pertain to young people’s interview
responses and, therefore, it is an extrapolation to claim that we should come to similar
conclusions about pupils’ reasoning during classroom exchanges. It would be safe to reckon
that where teachers are engaged in careful one-to-one and small group discussions, especially
when determined to spot difficulties and diagnose misunderstandings (or alternative frame-
works to use Driver’s 1981 term), what has been revealed in this research would certainly
apply. Beyond that, in teaching more generally, we see no reason to believe that switching
would not take place, simply that the frequency of it might be lower and instances of it less
apparent. Our findings certainly corroborate the conclusions of those researchers concerned to
scaffold children’s learning with care, particularly those whom we cited earlier (e.g. see
Niebert et al. 2012). In their work to help young people develop scientific language, teachers
must work thoughtfully as they initially accept children’s everyday language and then help
them to appreciate and use more formalised, scientific expressions and ideas, encouraging
cross-checks in multiple modalities wherever possible. Rather than aiming to replace everyday
concepts with scientific ones, teachers and parents should recognise that both types of concepts
coexist and afford the opportunity to scaffold from one to the other.
Third, the tendency to categorise children’s everyday language as animistic is questionable
and must be weighed against the counterargument that much common language is rich in
figurative speech handed down through generations from parent to child. A quite specific
observation about folklore concerning the Chinese subjects in the research reported above
relates to the area where the research was conducted. The children in Changchun (Jilin
Province) on the Northeast China Plain talk of the Sun going behind the mountains when
there are no mountains visible at all. Interestingly, these children are the offspring of migrants
from Hebei and Shandong, more mountainous regions to the south (see Gottschang and Lary
2000). On their move to Jilin, did the people take their folklore (including stories of the Sun
and Moon going to rest behind mountains) with them? To investigate this question (within the
broader context that folklore is a deeply embedded rich source of imagery), we conducted a
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follow-up study of parents of Shandong ancestry. We found that concepts of the Sun and Moon
rising and setting behind mountains are indeed a common feature of local folklore and that
these ideas have been passed on from generation to generation.
Fourth, the research which we have described indicates that children’s grasp of scientific
ideas in this field may ordinarily be under-estimated if one only goes by formal scientific
expression and vocabulary. Again, generalising to the classroom, this has an awkward
corollary in that recent educational movements are obliging young pupils to be familiar with
scientific expressions at younger ages than in the past. In several countries, government
pressures, stemming largely from international league table comparisons (like PISA), have
resulted in curriculum change where there were more formalised treatments of science figure
earlier in school. Handled clumsily, these can so easily run counter to sensible practice in
teaching. Policies or practices which, intentionally or not, denigrate or prematurely discourage
everyday modes of thinking are mistaken. As mentioned above, rather than attempting to
replace everyday language with scientific language, as some researchers and educationalists
have argued, we should recognise their coexistence (see Fleer and Ridgway 2007) and use the
former as a basis to build (scaffold) the latter as originally advocated by Piaget and Vygotsky
(see Vygotsky 2012), e.g. by analogy (see Niebert et al. 2012). The matter interestingly
connects to research into the conditions under which learning is understood to transfer.
According to Wagner, BTransfer is revealed not as rooted in the acquisition of increasingly
abstract mental representations, but through the incremental refinement of knowledge re-
sources that account for—rather than overlook—contextual variation^ (Wagner 2010, p. 1).
Fifth, on encouraging the emergence of disembedded thought/language, teachers and
parents could engage in unconventional teaching and learning experiences such as observing
sunrise and sunset with their children and imagining the Earth moving (rotating) towards the
Sun (sunrise) or away from the Sun (sunset). In other words, we have to give children Bdirect
experience with phenomena^ (Nussbaum and Novak 1976) to enable them to break away from
traditional contexts. There is also a need to be more selective about the role of children’s
literature to ensure a balance between everyday and scientific perspectives or to use stories
based on folklore to lead into alternative (scientific) explanation. Disembedding could also be
enhanced by the use of media such as drawing and play-dough modelling to reinforce concepts
being introduced by verbal language, so encouraging the growth of scientific reasoning.
Sixth, and again extrapolating beyond that which has been revealed from interview
analyses, switching between everyday and scientific modes is not restricted to children or to
modes. Adults commonly switch between modes of behaviour according to cultural tradition.
For example, a teacher in New Zealand may switch from teaching science to preparing to
celebrate Christmas with her family or a parent in China may switch from manufacturing
computer components to preparing food to celebrate the Spring Festival. Similar examples
pertain to other cultures. Thus, the idea of coexisting modes should not surprise but rather
should be acknowledged as a natural feature of the evolution of human behaviour, language
and thought.
Further Research
The study indicates that researchers still have much to focus upon regarding the speech
repertoires of young people. Future research can usefully follow several different leads opened
up by the work described in this paper. Two areas are considered here.
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How Embedded Is Animism?
Researchers typically view the children’s use of figurative speech and animism as one and the
same thing: animism is figurative and is firmly grounded in the culture which young people
experience. From such a perspective, early language derives from the particular folklore which
children are immersed in. Bedtime stories, parental explanations, preschool play, guidance
from peers and so forth all provide a repertoire of language which shapes how children learn to
talk. In this view, animism and figurative speech are totally embedded. An alternative might be
to distinguish between animism and figurative speech (which Piaget himself did not do) and to
consider figurative speech rather more generally as disembedded—albeit an early and imper-
fect form (scientifically speaking)—but one which leads to a better understanding of subse-
quent scientific language. This is to propose that language switching may be more
sophisticated than is generally acknowledged. Writers like Solomon (1983c) have emphasised
the distinction between the embedded and disembedded modes of thought/language (the terms
in italics were introduced by Donaldson 1978); perhaps these modes are more intertwined. In a
nutshell then, we may be underestimating children’s ability by labelling all of their figurative
speech as animism. Difficult though it will be to research it may be important to investigate
whether animistic expressions were derived from two repertoires of speech, not one—collo-
quial (or vernacular) language—and to consider whether (or how and when) figurative speech
is not only animism but a form of disembedded thought/language which itself facilitates a
grasp of better scientific language.
And as aforementioned, our research indicates that folklore (including animism, anthropo-
morphism, figurative speech and personification) is a major source if not the primary source of
everyday concepts of the Earth, Sun and Moon. Exploring further the ‘migration of folklore’
(like the sleeping of the Sun or Moon behind the mountains) would make an interesting
ethnological study for future research.
Mental Imagery
A second area for research, one which will require innovative technology to fully pursue,
concerns the imagery which subjects use when reasoning. In the literature review, we raised
Pylyshyn’s (2003) question about whether images, such as those of the Earth, the Sun and the
Moon (ESM), are spatially displayed pictures or some other forms of analogous representation.
The research conducted here raises the question of whether new insights could be gained by
asking children to describe in greater detail how they visualise the shape of ESM (static
imagery) and the motion of ESM (dynamic imagery) and repeating the same questions some
weeks or months later to see if the same descriptions are repeated. Disentangling individual’s
capabilities of developing dynamic imagery from static imagery as a result of key life
experiences (including the interviewing itself) will be difficult. In the future, when brain
scanning technologies become more sophisticated, it may of course prove possible to scan
brain activity areas for both their location and the nature of the images (static versus active)
sensed by a person in response to questions posed.
Finally
Attention should be paid by researchers and teachers to the awkward uses of ‘rotation’ and
‘revolution’ in common speech. Children’s spinning tops rotate and, for comparison purposes,
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do simulate the way in which the Earth moves to yield day and night; playground roundabouts
go ‘round and round’, and again for comparison purposes, a teacher might say that a person on
the outside is revolving around the centre, just like the Earth goes round the Sun. ‘Spinning’
and ‘going round and round’ are everyday/spontaneous concepts based on embedded cultural
contexts which need to be distinguished to become the scientific concepts of rotation and
revolution, respectively. However, some large department stores have doors which spin, but
adults generally say that these are revolving doors—adding to puzzlement when the teachers’
scientific language describes the Earth’s movement around the Sun as a revolution. And this
mix-up is compounded where inaccurate children’s literature attributes daytime and night-time
to the revolution of the Earth around the Sun rather than the rotation of the Earth on its axis
and, in a small minority of cases, where uses of the terms rotation and revolution treat them as
if they were synonyms. Piaget said that adult language is unhelpfully childish at times; he
could well have added that adult language is often downright confusing.
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